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Author’s introduction
The last 30 years have witnessed a momentous shift in our thinking about international
justice. Since the end of the Cold War, humanitarian law has become a prominent tool
in the struggle against genocide and other human rights violations. The dislodging of
international relations from state-centric concerns regarding the balance of power and
maintenance of international peace brought in its train a further departure from the old
paradigm of realpolitik. Thanks to growing awareness of the impact of heightened
economic globalization on the world’s poor, underdevelopment has emerged alongside
social justice and human rights as a pressing matter of deep concern. The study
I propose in World Crisis and Underdevelopment aims to develop a critical theory
that draws together these normative concerns within a critique of contemporary global
capitalism.
Critical theory reﬂects on the social crisis as the inextricable dilemma of our times.
World Crisis and Underdevelopment extends this reﬂection to illuminate the injustices
and social pathologies that speciﬁcally inform poverty remediation and social development within the current global order. My institutional analysis of that order draws from
a wide range of thinkers within critical theory. Although it chieﬂy takes its normative
bearings from Habermas’ theory of communicative action and Honneth’s theory of
recognition, it also appropriates much of the social contractarian tradition descending
from Rawls and his followers along with insights developed by proponents of the
capabilities approach.
As I see it, critical theory’s chief advantage over competing approaches lies in its
linkage of theory and practice. In contrast to idealizing theory, it situates itself at the
crossroads of historical reality and experience. How the disadvantaged experience
deprivation and powerlessness as a modality of structural coercion guides its criticism.
A theory whose aim is to clarify and critically deepen that experience – and theoretical
enlightenment can do nothing more than explain widespread feelings of unhappiness
and injustice with an eye towards inducing emancipatory struggle – must conceive its
task modestly, as crystalizing potentials for short-term and long-term change within the
limits of historically malleable humanity, its evolving nature and institutions.
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W. Sheridan Rd, Chicago, IL 60660, USA
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In my opinion, most of what passes as critical theory today has dissociated itself from
empirical social science and what, for lack of a better term, might be described as
applied social theory. Critical theory’s original guiding thought as laid out by Karl Marx
and later by Max Horkheimer in his famous manifesto, Traditional and Critical
Theory – to shed light on contemporary social struggles for purposes of enlightening
progressive tendencies – has been largely replaced by critical commentary on critical
theorists themselves – an important and necessary task, to be sure, but not the ultimate
aim. After years of writing a commentary on theorists – some of which is continued in
the present study – I have turned my attention to thicker descriptions of the concrete
institutions, social practices, and social actors inhabiting the current global system. As
I have attempted to show in my companion text to World Crisis and Underdevelopment,
The Ethics of Development: An Introduction (Routledge, 2018), which I co-authored
with Thomas Derdak, philosopher and founder of Global Alliance for Africa, a great
deal of critical social description can be undertaken by contrasting competing social
perspectives on globalization, its institutions, and its recurring crises, without having to
wade too deeply into the waters of abstract theory.
Focusing as I do on applied social theory has come at the cost of my developing
ﬁner-grained commentary and theory-building. Taking a path of least resistance, I have
simply borrowed insights from a number of diﬀerent thinkers. As for the normative
impulse that chieﬂy impels my study – a theory of agency – I have mainly relied on the
pioneering work of two very diﬀerent thinkers who have at various times characterized
their projects as retrieving the Hegelian legacy and its distinctly social (intersubjective
and recognitive) account of free agency. In Habermas’ theory of communicative action,
I ﬁnd resources for developing an ontological account of agency that, when suitably
supplemented by an historical theory of modernity, also has potential to provide
scaﬀolding for an abstract moral theory of universal human rights and political democracy. In Honneth’s theory of recognition and social freedom, I ﬁnd an ethical complement to Habermas’ theory that focuses much more concretely on the interactive
dynamics of modern social practices and institutions.
In general, what has been described as the ethical turn in critical theory towards
concrete historical understanding and thick institutional description oﬀers a refreshing
antidote to a procedural focus on formal accountability. The latter focus, as explained
by Habermas, eschews any reference to the non-universalizable value-laden motivations
that inform the shared understandings of everyday agents in their institutionally
embedded interactions. At the same time, the procedural reconstruction of mutually
accountable interaction oﬀers a way to begin to conceive the possibility of a universal
dimension of morality that transcends the parochial ethical understandings of concretely situated actors: human rights.
As I point out in the introduction to World Crisis and Underdevelopment, these
theories, as they have been richly elaborated by their authors, are programmatic and
have yet to be worked out in a fully coherent manner. Aside from their somewhat
conﬂicting accounts of societal practices and institutions – Habermas’ strong diﬀerentiation between lifeworld and system versus Honneth’s de-diﬀerentiation of the same
being one example that comes to mind – both theories have been criticized for
harbouring a Eurocentric bias in their interpretation of what counts as universal
‘progress’ at both individual and societal levels of development. Indeed, as Amy
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Allen, drawing from Theodor Adorno and Michel Foucault, trenchantly argues the
concept of universal progress is itself intrinsically suspect.
Although I share Allen’s concern, I do not think that critical theory can nor should
abandon all references to the idea of progress (and neither, I take it, does Allen). In
World Crisis and Underdevelopment, I argue that theories of progress are historically
path-dependent. What critical theorists, drawing from the German Idealist tradition,
refer to as modern progress is predominantly (perhaps exclusively) informed by the
European experience. The claim to universality made on behalf of a European experience of modern enlightenment was, in fact, ideological. It was true (for Europeandescended peoples) to the extent that it was embedded in a historical narrative that
interpreted the end of slavery and feudalism and the birth of liberal freedom, equality,
and democracy as progress. It was false (for non-European descended peoples) who
suﬀered the violence of European ethnocentrism, racism, and colonialism in the name
of those very same ideals.
So why retain such a benighted notion as progress (or development)? Social criticism
could survive the loss of grand narratives of progress. One could simply narrow one’s
critical focus to this or that group having suﬀering uncontestable material deprivation
(starvation, say) or violence/disrespect (genocide or torture, say). Decrying these kinds
of outrages requires no theory – not even ethical theory. Theory becomes necessary in
explaining, to ourselves and others, why we feel compelled to decry them. Beyond that,
a theory is needed to explain why societal safeguards might be needed to protect against
them.
Justifying our moral outrage against this or that injustice supplemented by a desire
for this or that societal reform needn’t require anything like a universal theory of
progress. Immanent criticism grounded on a given community’s (unfulﬁlled) moral
expectations can suﬃce. However, if the outrages in question are not local but global,
and if we then expect that anyone should perceive that outrage as we do, and that
therefore some reforms are necessary or at any rate better than others, then taking
a step in the direction of universal morality and comparative assessments of progress in
social reform is unavoidable. Certainly, our universal-settled judgement that slavery,
genocide, torture, and starvation are wrong might overlap or converge for diﬀerent
(perhaps incommensurable) theoretical reasons, but the bare assertion that there exists
such a convergence and that the convergence is right will require a theory of progress.
This will be a theory of relative progress accompanied by a theory of relative loss or
regress. As critical theorists ceaselessly point out, progress within any social dimension
is ‘dialectical.’ That holds doubly true when talking about conﬂicts between dimensions.
Thus, the destruction of traditional life wrought by European modernity ‘emancipated’
European individuals from certain forms of hierarchically structured solidarity groupings while subjecting them to new forms of hierarchy, domination, and ‘egalitarian’
mass society and ‘democratic’ civic solidarity. And the economic changes associated
with that emancipatory subjugation, namely those accompanying the emergence of
capitalism, were accompanied by new legal-technical forms of domination that, in
turn, both enabled and undermined individualism and civic solidarity.
Progress is relative – historically, dimensionally, and contextually. What enables –
and to a certain extent justiﬁes our use of – the idea of universal progress is the fact of
globalization itself. Thanks to a process of globalization that extends back hundreds of
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years, the economic-legal system that originated in Europe has generated the same
threats to human well-being and the same (or similar) moral responses to those threats
everywhere, even though the precise manifestation of threat and response varies from
place to place.
That said, historical memory is probably not (pace Honneth) the main reason why
non-Europeans (as opposed to Europeans) would regard human rights as
a permanent template for universal moral progress. A more plausible reason why
many non-Europeans regard human rights this way – and one which leads me to
note another weakness in the phenomenologically motivated idealism implicit in
Habermas’ and Honneth’s normative theories – is that, as Andrew Feenberg puts it,
the material resistance of legal-economic-political techno-systems generates its own
momentum that cannot be undone, save for some apocalyptic catastrophe. NonEuropeans, for the most part, have no long Hegelian memory of the events that
compelled the formation of the modern European Rechtsstaat, its imperialistic
demise and postwar social democratic rebirth (which is not to deny that they may
have a diﬀerent memory of analogous events in their nation’s past). Instead of
regarding human rights as the necessary, progressive culmination of a painful and
protracted learning process, they are likely to regard it simply as a more or less
permanent feature of the global modernization process that has engulfed them. For
them, the ‘rights of man and citizen’ are increasingly becoming a new second nature
by force of imposition as much as by moral struggle, just as they became second
nature for Europeans during the long course of juridical modernization that inaugurated the end of feudalism (Gemeinschaft) and the birth of civil society
(Gesellschaft).
Now that I have explained why I think ‘progress’ and ‘development’ can (and must)
ﬁnd some qualiﬁed application in critical theory, let me turn to the argument of my
book. As I mentioned above, World Crisis and Underdevelopment does not aim to
develop a new comprehensive critical theory of development. Rather, it draws its
inspiration from a number of critical theory traditions. I adumbrate my own critical reappropriation of these traditions and other normative traditions within AngloAmerican social philosophy in the Introduction. This theoretical discussion follows
upon a short synopsis of global crisis tendencies and the failure of international
institutions to remedy them commensurate with their own expectations. Here
I defend global justice and human rights as two distinctive approaches to measuring
the wrongs inﬂicted on the poor and vulnerable by a global capitalist system and its
institutional pillars. I also propose several controversial theses, including the thesis that
agency itself consists of conﬂicting aspects, that competing narratives of development
highlight one aspect of agency (and freedom) to the exclusion of others, and that
determining the causes of poverty and economic inequality is not necessary for determining whether poverty is unjust and whether we have duties to remedy it; the coercive
nature of extreme poverty in its disparate positioning of persons with respect to
opportunities for leading a worthwhile life suﬃces to condemn it. Another controversial
thesis I propose is that humanitarian law (for example, the prohibition against human
traﬃcking) can confront those it ostensibly protects as an unsuspected form of coercion. Criminalizing human traﬃcking and coercing those who voluntarily consent to
being traﬃcked to testify as witnesses against traﬃckers impose risks on those who are
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traﬃcked and fails to address the coercion eﬀected by a global economic system that
regularly produces poverty, social inequality, and insecurity.
In order to grasp the phenomenon of coercion as a function of structural and social
incapacitation, I begin by discussing (in chapter one) the concept of agency. Agency is
the basic capability (or good) that human beings must have in order to acquire other
capabilities. It forms the core of our freedom and thus constitutes one of the most
central foci of human rights protection. It also constitutes the heart of social justice; for
if agency implicates a distinctly social conception of freedom, as I think it must,
freedom from social domination born of excessive social inequality must be one of its
conditions.
Chapter one elaborates the concept of agency as social freedom. I begin this chapter
by criticizing minimalist accounts of agency that neglect agency’s social dimension. This
dimension, I argue, is partly captured by Hegel’s understanding of the importance of
social recognition, in which what is done as well as who is doing it depends on the
critical conﬁrmation from others. From this quasi-ontological characterization, which
can be analysed in terms of a model of communicative interaction of the sort developed
by Habermas, Brandom, and Pippin, I then propose, following Honneth and Taylor,
several ethically richer schemes of social recognition. The historical (or teleological)
scheme distinguishes between traditional and modern forms of social recognition, with
the former based on the fulﬁlment of concrete role expectations within social hierarchies premised on honour and unquestioned (often inherited) authority, and the latter
based on the fulﬁlment of abstract role expectations within egalitarian relationships of
mutual accountability premised on mutual respect for the dignity and freedom of the
other. The societal scheme distinguishes between familial, moral, and socio-ethical types
of social recognition. These types of recognition foster (respectively) self-conﬁdence
(through loving relationships), self-respect (through moral relationships), and selfesteem (through forms of cooperative work and group membership).
Elaborating on this schema, I further diﬀerentiate social recognition and agency,
noting that diﬀerent types of agency and social recognition can be developed in
opposition to each other. Here I endorse Nancy Fraser’s criticism of Honneth’s reduction of economic, political, and cultural injustices to experiences of misrecognition.
Following her lead, I suggest that we view all injustices – if not all forms of social
pathology–as violations of a principle of participatory parity in discussing not only
cultural roles, economic distributions, and political systems of representation, but in
questioning the basic frameworks in which such questions of justice are raised in the
ﬁrst place. In the ﬁnal analysis, I propose a combination of Fraser’s Habermas-inspired
deontological theory of democratic justice and Honneth’s teleological theory of recognitive development. Thus, using the example of microcredit in a social context still
marked by traditional forms of recognition, I argue that the development of feminist
agency, which may come at the expense of welfare agency, requires an expansive
understanding of agency that entails participatory parity in all three dimensions of
social interaction.
Chapter two exposes the underlying racism and ethnocentrism of modern development theory, speciﬁcally highlighting the failure of public policy and ethical theory to
adequately conceptualize the relationship between poverty and coercion. I begin with
a discussion of the debate over the causes of poverty in the USA and the importance of
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social recognition in establishing a notion of rational autonomy. I argue that the two
dominant views embedded in public policy expertise – that poverty is caused by
deﬁcient cognitive and moral habits of the poor (the so-called ‘culture of poverty’
view) and that poverty is caused by lack of economic opportunities (the so-called
‘structural imposition of poverty’ view) – oversimplify a more complex reality. The
moral and cognitive ‘habits’ of the poor often reﬂect rational choices in the short term
that are sub-optimal in the long run; but these choices, however free and rational they
may be, are not wholly unconstrained. They are coerced by situations characterized by
lack of opportunity. In contrast to the abstract, individualistic understanding of free,
rational choice (autonomy) found in liberal social contract theory, I defend a socialinteractive view, which emphasizes the unreliability of our individual-centred knowledge of others, which unavoidably relies on second-hand expertise. Given the superﬁcial
picture of poverty provided by so-called experts, typically depicted as shortfalls in
household income, and the susceptibility of such supposedly value-neutral data to
multiple – conservative and progressive – interpretations, I argue that ‘poverty knowledge’ should take its bearings from qualitative ﬁeld research grounded in narrative
interpretation of the sort that was pioneered by the Chicago Settlement movement. So
construed, poverty knowledge would shed its deceptive appearance as a value-neutral,
objective science and become a partisan advocate on behalf of enlightening, emancipating, and empowering the poor.
Using a combined discourse- and recognition-theoretic approach to reforming
poverty expertise, I then turn to several models that have been proposed for implementing international development. Despite its checkered history as recounted in postcolonial literature, the right to development, I argue, can become an eﬀective right once
it is theoretically elaborated and practically implemented in dialogical collaboration
between local communities and experts. The disadvantages of direct aid, even when it
involves mediation of technical expertise and local knowledge, recommend alternative
strategies of development that build on inclusive economic collaboration between
cooperative worker-management experiments and foreign businesses. Fair trade relationships need to abide by discourse ethical norms of cooperation that respect the
dignity and interests of all parties. However, as I point out, such negotiations will be
constrained so long as power imbalances between providers and recipients of developmental assets persist.
Part two examines some of the most important global crises that threaten development today: coercive migration, poverty and global inequality, and environmental
destruction. Chapter three discusses the ethical, political, and legal responsibilities
associated with modern migration. Political refugees ﬂeeing violence continue to suﬀer
human rights violations and injustices at the hands of their would-be protectors, who
have few qualms about treating them as criminals. The justiﬁcation for this treatment is
the suspicion that self-identiﬁed political refugees are really economic opportunists.
I argue that the distinction between political and economic migrants fails to apply when
one scrutinizes today’s global political economy, in which varying degrees of political
abuse intersect a coercive and hostile economic environment. Economic refugees who
engage the services of smugglers belie the stereotype of passive victims; being neither
accomplice to nor the victim of crime, the migrant who is compelled to violate the law
out of desperation diminishes her own agency. I argue, however, that uprooting oneself
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from a community of social recognition out of economic necessity is agency diminishing even when undertaken legally. This diminishment is experienced by both migrants
and the families (especially the children) they leave behind.
In my opinion, neither communitarian nor cosmopolitan moral theories adequately
respond to the dilemmas faced by migrants who are forced to sacriﬁce some portion of
their agency. Standing between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, discourse
ethics, I submit, responds more sensitively to this dilemma. Although discourse ethics
provides a warrant for questioning border and immigration policy, its true value,
I argue, resides in mandating an empathetic application of immigration law in a way
that does justice to the uniquely coercive life circumstances of each claimant to
asylum.
Chapter four examines the economic forces that drive migration. I begin by examining one political factor underlying these forces: the imperial hegemony exercised by
the USA and its allies in imposing a neo-liberal regime of ﬁnance and trade that
perpetuates neo-colonial dependency and inequality between developed and developing
nations. After laying out the multiple social contractarian duties of repair and care that
the USA and its allies have with respect to the global poor subject to their governance,
I analyse the global economy from a less political social contractarian perspective. I ask
whether an unregulated (viz. free) global trade regime of the sort defended by neoliberal
apologists can be justiﬁed as mutually beneﬁcial to all contracting parties. Crucial to my
inquiry is an analysis of the principle of comparative advantage that economists invoke
in touting the beneﬁts of free trade in reducing poverty and advancing development.
In recommending models of poverty reduction and development that endorse fair
trade principles permitting protectionist and import-substitution policies for developing nations, I defend internationally engaged forms of economic cooperation that take
account of the environmental and climatological eﬀects of global production. Although
I do not discount the advantages of combining market-based solutions to this problem
with stronger forms of democratic regulation, I submit that any such model of green,
sustainable development needs to be qualiﬁed by a sober analysis of the growth
dynamics driving capitalism, which undermine eﬀorts at government regulation.
I therefore conclude that, given this contradiction between capitalism and democracy,
any long-term solution to the chief economic and political crisis of our era will require
infusing the economy with discourse ethical principles of the sort commensurate with
market socialism and workplace democracy.
Special duties owed to co-nationals and foreigners who participate in, or ﬁnd
themselves subjected to, legal–political relationships of trade, ﬁnance, and imperial
domination, must be distinguished from the truly universal cosmopolitan duties owed
to all human beings with whom we might have a lesser degree of contact. The question
I address in chapter ﬁve is whether such universal duties, speciﬁcally as they ﬂow from
human rights, provide a diﬀerent set of reasons for condemning the economic injustices
noted above. For example, ecological costs of doing business that endanger human
rights might not be justiﬁable by appeal to overall greater beneﬁts of doing business. If
this is so, I argue, it is because human rights law imposes a duty on states to provide
robust levels of social welfare to their subjects that should not be hindered by conditions of ﬁnance and trade imposed on states by the World Bank, the World Trade
Organization, and other global economic multilaterals (GEMs).
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It might be argued that such a robust interpretation of human rights cannot be
justiﬁed or practically implemented. Following an argument developed recently by
Allen Buchanan, I argue that the problem of rights inﬂation, while real, is partly
a ﬁgment of the philosophical fantasy that there is only one justiﬁcation for human
rights: their moral role in protecting the individual agency. Once we drop this
Mirroring View (as Buchanan refers to it) we are free to think of human rights as
having multiple moral grounds, compatible with collectivist moralities, group rights,
and the procurement of social welfare.
Having refuted one-sided political, constitutional, and ethical (agent-centred) theories of human rights, I argue that an institutional understanding of human rights must
accompany an interactional understanding, if we are to grasp the full range of justiciable human rights claims (both criminal and civil) that touch on poverty and resource
deprivation. This explains why the oﬃcial addressees of human rights should be
expanded to include non-state institutions. I conclude by defending a human right to
democratic participation, which I argue must be respected at the level of global
governance as well.
Chapter six examines the legitimation crisis facing the current human rights regime.
Lack of accountability, both internal and external, has rendered this regime powerless to
mitigate current humanitarian crises. Reforming that regime, I submit, requires infusing it with constitutional structure of the kind found in liberal democracy. This regime
should incorporate institutions that function more like legislative, judicial, and executive bodies without, however, evolving into a full-ﬂedged, democratic world
government.
Buchanan’s qualiﬁed justiﬁcation of the current regime poses a serious challenge to
my thesis insofar as he understands the regime’s legitimacy as suﬃciently established by
its modular composition and dependence on sovereign democratic states. Although
I agree that Buchanan’s ecological understanding of the relationship between international human rights law and sovereign states is basically correct and allows for potential
reform of the human rights system in ways that will increase its overall legitimacy,
I submit that it does not go far enough in addressing concerns that Buchanan himself
raises regarding human rights treaty law as an instrument for combatting global poverty
and climate change.
To see how this might be done, I examine Habermas’ much-debated proposal for
making the UNSC and the General Assembly more democratically accountable and less
subject to manipulation by entrenched government interests. Habermas’ intriguing
proposal for integrating transnational negotiations regarding trade, development, and
global environmental risks into human rights law as well as his suggestion that international human rights courts exercise some kind of review over executive decisions
renders plausible a global institution that Habermas endorses at the domestic level:
a constitutional court. Taking up this intriguing possibility, I examine the Kadi case in
which judicial review has already been eﬀectively exercised by the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) with respect to the UN Security Council’s unconstitutional listing of
individuals suspected of terrorist activity.
The ﬁnal chapter examines the possibilities for achieving solidarity in ﬁghting global
poverty and global environmental damage. Among the various types of solidarity, civic
solidarity shows promise as an achievable cosmopolitan goal. However, its volatile
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combination of cosmopolitan and national loyalties raises obvious doubts on this score.
One such doubt is scepticism about the human rights that compose its cosmopolitan
core. Two sceptical challenges merit special consideration in this regard: the charge that
human rights conﬂict with national obligations and the objection that they reﬂect
a Western secular bias.
Responding to the ﬁrst objection, I argue that the conﬂict between human rights and
duties to the community, although internal to the humanitarian order, expresses
a conﬂict that can occur between any human rights, in this instance between human
rights ascribed to individuals and those ascribed to groups. Not only are group-ascribed
human rights genuinely irreducible to individual-ascribed human rights, but both rights
together capture the dual kinds of solidarity that should inform global democratic
governance. A further concern that democratic deliberation erodes group solidarity
likewise vindicates democracy’s genuine potential to critically transform cultural identities without, however, undermining cultural attachments as such. Encouraging cultural groups to reﬂectively revise their self-understandings in dialogue with other
groups further facilitates the convergence of group solidarities and cosmopolitan
solidarity.
This fact informs my response to the second objection, which holds that human
rights and secular democracy conﬂict with the core commitments of Islam and other
world religions. I argue that this objection is not only unsubstantiated but neglects the
contribution of world religion as the most original cosmopolitan form of solidarity –
and one, moreover, that has recently assumed prominence in promoting human rights
and secular democracy. This contribution depends on the capacity of believers and
non-believers alike to avail themselves of the cultural values solidifying social justice
struggles within the civil dialogue, qualiﬁed by the constraints of public reason.
The existence of sectarian fundamentalism reminds us of the formidable barriers that
must be overcome in order to achieve solidarity. In this regard global capitalism
imposes an especially formidable barrier. Not only does capitalism feed a self-centred
consumer mentality that is hostile to communal forms of solidarity, but it exacerbates
class conﬂict. Its pathological forgetfulness of any socially recognized community
beyond that of economic status scarcely permits empathy for the world’s poor and
vulnerable.
I conclude that the possibility of achieving cosmopolitan civic solidarity depends on
forging a diﬀerent kind of cosmopolitan solidarity: Network solidarity. Building upon
the organic interdependence of groups struggling on behalf of diﬀerent constituents,
network solidarity opens lines of political communication that expand the internal
identiﬁcations and attachments of regional and sectorial social justice movements to
encompass a broader, cosmopolitan horizon of solidarity. My analysis of the social
factors engendering network solidarity – a preference for mutually beneﬁcial cooperation, a consciousness of social dependency, and an awareness of luck’s role in assigning
us our place in life – compels a guardedly optimistic assessment of the prospects for
achieving cosmopolitan civic solidarity.
I add this personal note as a ﬁnal guidepost for the reader. World Crisis and
Underdevelopment is dedicated to Herbert Marcuse, who by his teaching and conduct
inspired my interest in critical theory as a vehicle for political practice. Although I do
not cite him, this book honours his utopian vision. My life can be read from these pages
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as well: I organized boycotts on behalf of the United Farm Workers Union, accompanied Loyola’s students on their journey of awakening to Central America and the
Caribbean, worked with Guatemalan refugees and community organizers in Chicago,
and learned about the possibilities and limits of development while visiting the slums of
Kibera with aid providers. I hope World Crisis and Underdevelopment vindicates in
theory what our collective struggles have honoured in practice.

